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Abstract Most current approaches to scene understanding
lack the capability to adapt object and situation models to
behavioral needs not anticipated by the human system
designer. Here, we give a detailed description of a system
architecture for self-referential autonomous learning which
enables the refinement of object and situation models
during operation in order to optimize behavior. This
includes structural learning of hierarchical models for sit-
uations and behaviors that is triggered by a mismatch
between expected and actual action outcome. Besides
proposing architectural concepts, we also describe a first
implementation of our system within a simulated traffic
scenario to demonstrate the feasibility of our approach.
Keywords Self-referential control  Scene understanding 
Autonomous learning  Hierarchical situation model
Introduction
Scene understanding and situation recognition is an
important prerequisite for realizing intelligent mobile
support systems for humans, for example, driver assistance
systems or systems for autonomous driving [1–4]. Current
driver assistance systems provide comfort functions such as
lane keeping, pedestrian recognition, and cruise control
which have reasonably good performance because sensory
analysis is restricted to the recognition of a small set of
simple predefined object and situation templates (e.g., [5–
7]). However, when trying to perform the step from com-
fort functions toward autonomous behavior, the situation
complexity reaches a level, where hand constructed situa-
tion templates will fail, because they lack the capability to
adapt to behavioral needs not anticipated by the human
modeler of the template. For example, many current
approaches used in computer vision for situation under-
standing are mostly based on low-level sensory represen-
tation which are by principle not able to acquire relevant
information for behavior adaption [8–12] Other approaches
try a ‘‘full’’ semantic representation of the scene including
the recognition of all visible objects and situations for
which a template is available [13–15]. Such approaches
soon arrive at hard computational limits and generally do
not scale to real-world applications, because they neglect to
focus analysis on the most relevant items that are necessary
for making autonomous decisions and reaching behavioral
goals.
Thus, current systems seem to lack the capability to
adapt object and situation models adequately to the actual
behavioral needs defined by the situational context the
system is embodied in. To approach this problem, we have
worked out in the last years a brain-inspired cognitive
architecture for ‘‘self-referential’’ autonomous learning of
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hierarchical knowledge representations [16–19]. Key ele-
ments of our architecture are the acquisition of knowledge
based on behavioral needs and the reusability of parts of
the already acquired knowledge to explain new situations.
More specifically, acquisition or adaptation of object and
situation models is triggered by a mismatch between
actual behavioral outcome derived from the current sen-
sory input signals, and the expected outcome derived from
previously learned internal world models (cf., [20]).
Although this process is computationally expensive, our
system is able to at least partly automatize the process of
creating and adapting models for objects, situations and
behavior.
In this work, we give a detailed description of our
current implementation of the system architecture for self-
referential autonomous learning, which enables the
refinement of already-gathered knowledge by new expe-
rience to improve the system’s behavior. For example, our
architecture may enable a human designer to define the
system’s task by hand-engineering a corresponding high-
level behavioral model that includes situations and their
corresponding sensory representations, expected out-
comes of relevant actions, and a reward function on the
situation states to specify the goal of the task. Although
this hand-designed model is easily integrated into the
system’s concept ontology by making references to
already existing concepts, it will typically be incomplete
because the human designer will not be able to identify all
relevant model components for solving the task (not to
mention model parameters). Our system enables now the
refinement of the existing knowledge representations by
refining the object and situation models in parallel with
the agent’s behavior. That is, starting from a low-di-
mensional imprecise state space, the mechanism of self-
referential autonomous learning expands the situation
space according to behavioral needs. Due to the hierar-
chical knowledge organization, an iterative refinement of
both situation and behavioral models is possible. Our
work demonstrates how such a process can quickly
improve system performance.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces
the basic concepts including the format of hierarchical
situation and action models, and a description of structural
learning for specializing or generalizing these models.
Then Section 3 describes the current implementation of our
architecture within the context of a simple simulated traffic
scenario, where a car agent learns to drive safely over a
zebra crossing. Section 4 shows corresponding simulation
results. Finally, Section 5 concludes and discusses our




It is important to distinguish between the two terms
‘‘scene’’ and ‘‘situation’’: We define a scene as a set of
entities that give a rich, potentially complete, perceptual
description of the current sensory environment of the
subject. By contrast, we define a situation as a behaviorally
relevant state of a subject, closely related to action options
and outcomes.
We will give more precise definitions below, but want
to emphasize here that, according to our definitions, a
scene refers predominantly to the perceivable environ-
ment describing the circumfluent space. In contrast, a
situation is rather the task-driven interpretation of a scene
referring also to behavioral models, action outcomes, and
internal states of the subject such as intentions or goals. In
this view, a situation model mediates between perception
and action by defining behavioral relevant scene entities
necessary to recognize the situation as well as providing
necessary parameters for associated actions. While scenes
are potentially full descriptions of the perceptually sen-
sible entities in the external environment, situations
include only behaviorally relevant entities that are nec-
essary to recognize the situation and/or to initiate appro-
priate actions.
Such a distinction between ‘‘scene’’ and ‘‘situation’’ is
largely consistent with the etymologies of the two terms
and is as well reflected in brain structure. In fact, the brain
has separate centers for realizing a sensory ‘‘scene’’
memory in the retrosplenial and in the parahippocampal
cortex integrating currently processed objects within the
current spatial context [21–23], and another set of struc-
tures for realizing a ‘‘behavioral’’ working memory in the
frontal cortex and associated regions that integrate sen-
sory entities with the current situational context including
current goals, action options, and expected outcomes [24–
26].
Note that our idea of a situation differs from situation
calculus [27] as we cannot easily identify a situation with
a sequence of actions or a universal state. Unlike in
common Markov decision processes (MDPs) [28, 29] or
partially observable MDPs [30, 31], our idea of situations
corresponds to neither a fixed set of states nor observa-
tions, but rather assumes a more flexible dynamic
structure as we will see below in more detail. This
includes, for example, hierarchical organization and,
unlike many hierarchical MDP approaches [32], also
learning mechanisms for re-structuring by specialization
and generalization.
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Knowledge Representation
Hierarchy of Scene Entity Models
By scene entities, we denote elements of a scene such as
objects, situations, relations between other scene entities,
and spatial layouts being containers for other scene entities.
Each scene entity model specifies the process of sensory
recognition of the scene entity, for example, by defining
type and locations of relevant parts to attend to. All scene
entity models are included as nodes in a graphical structure
that we call hierarchical scene entity model. Basically, the
hierarchical scene entity model contains a has-parts
ontology and an is-a ontology. The former describes the
decomposition of a higher-level concept into several lower-
level parts, and the latter covers variances by allowing
several subtypes of a concept.
Our model has close relationships to previously pro-
posed standard models for brain-inspired object recogni-
tion. For example, biological neural network models often
consist of a hierarchical arrangement of simple (S) and
complex (C) cells that employs similar mechanisms as our
model to represent part-whole (S) and type-subtype-rela-
tionships (C) (e.g., [10, 11]): S cells essentially implement
an AND operation, i.e., an S cell gets activated if there is
sensory evidence for part 1 AND part 2 AND part 3.
Similarly, C cells implement an OR operation, i.e., a C
cells gets activated if there is sensory evidence for con-
figuration 1 OR configuration 2 OR configuration 3. Within
a probabilistic framework, one can think of such models as
being composed of AND and OR layers resulting in a
polytree-like graphical structure without any loops for
which there exist efficient belief propagation methods such
as the sum-product and max-sum algorithms (e.g., see
[33]).
Figure 1 illustrates a related model by Zhu and Mum-
ford [13]. This so-called AND/OR graph (AOG) model is
again a hierarchy of AND and OR node layers within a
probabilistic framework as discussed above. However, it
extends the tree-type standard models by horizontal links
within the OR layers to express relations between the parts
of an AND node. Note that such links introduce loops such
that exact probabilistic inference becomes infeasible in
general.
At the present stage of research, the hierarchical scene
entity model is represented as a deterministic AND-OR-
graph as illustrated in Fig. 2 and closely related to [13, 34].
Here, a relation corresponds to a special node below an
AND node. To check if a certain situation represented by
an AND node holds, first, all non-relation children of the
AND node have to be checked, before it can be determined
whether the children are in a certain relation. Each of the
AND and OR nodes may represent the sensory configura-
tion for recognizing a certain situation.
As shown in Fig. 2, a specialization s1 of a situation s1 is
located above the layer of s1. The refined situation s

1 adds
more details (node new) to the sensory configuration of s1.
Thus, a consecutive refinement process of the sensory
configuration is reached by going upwards into the spe-
cializations of a certain situation.
Situation Model
Formally, we define a situation model as a triple
s ¼ ðsc;F;AÞ. The first component sc is a link to a scene
entity model as explained in the previous section. This link
basically defines how to test whether situation s holds by
analyzing the sensory input.
Second, F ¼ ff1; f2; . . .g is a set of expected feedbacks
fi ¼ ðl; rÞ that may occur in situation s, where l is a textual
label and r is a real-valued expected reward. Several expected
feedbacks are possible in one situation. For example the sit-
uation s1 ‘‘drive safely over zebra crossing’’ contains further
sub-situations such as s11 ‘‘stopped at zebra crossing’’ and s12
‘‘crossed zebra crossing.’’ Those sub-situations expect dif-
ferent feedbacks F11 and F12, respectively, with labels f11 ¼
ð0reward for stopping correctly at z:c:0; 0:1Þ and f12 ¼

















































Fig. 2 Hierarchical scene entity model
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higher-level situation s1 ¼‘‘drive safely over zebra crossing’’
then expects both feedback types with F1 ¼ ff11; f12g.
Finally, A ¼ fa1; a2; . . .g is a set of possible actions ai
that may be executed in situation s. The following section
gives a formal description of actions.
Action Model
In each situation si a set of actions
aj ¼ ðsinit; bmlow; sgoal; aactÞ
can be performed which may result in a situation transition.
Formally, we define an action as a quadruple
a ¼ ðsinit; bmlow; sgoal; aactÞ, where we distinguish two
types: First, a low-level action alow ¼ ðsinit ¼
None; bmlow ¼ None; sgoal ¼ None; aact 6¼ NoneÞ controls
directly relevant actuator states such as the gas pedal
position of a car by performing the actuator function aact
which is a parametrized interface to the actual actuators of
the agent. Second, a high-level action ahigh ¼ ðsinit 6¼
None; bmlow 6¼ None; sgoal 6¼ None; aact ¼ NoneÞ consists
of (1) a (higher-level) initial situation sinit which defines the
execution condition for the action, (2) a behavioral model
bmlow defining a (lower-level) policy to execute the action,
and (3) a (higher-level) goal situation sgoal which defines
the deactivation condition of the action. Thus, actions have
a hierarchical structure via behavioral models that com-
prise a detailed (lower-level) plan to execute the (higher-
level) action and reach the desired goal. This is explained
in more detail by the following section.
Hierarchical Behavioral Model
Situations are always embedded in behavior. This means
that each situation si affords a set of actions ai that could be
performed. Each action will lead to a situation transition
stþ1 ¼ f ðst; atÞ. Such transitions can be represented as a
graph or, more generally, as a Markov model with transition
probabilities pr½stþ1jst; at. Thus, a behavioral model is
closely related to the theory of Markov decision processes
(MPD) [35] and can be modeled as bm ¼ ðS;A;P;RÞ where
S is a set of situation models, A is a set of actions, P ¼
S A S ! ½0; 1 is the transition distribution, and
Rðstþ1jst; atÞ is the expected reward. Fig. 3 illustrates a
behavioral model as a graph where nodes denote situations
and arrows correspond to lower-level actions intending
certain situation transitions. Note that behavioral models
have a hierarchical structure because each lower-level action
may consist again of a lower-level behavioral model.
A situation node s in a behavioral model bm executed
through a higher-level action ahigh can be of the following
types:
• Initial Situation sinit
An initial situation of bm is a specialization of the
initial situation of ahigh in the corresponding higher-
level behavioral model.
• Goal Situation sgoal
A goal situation of bm is a specialization of the goal
situation ahigh in the corresponding higher-level behav-
ioral model.
• Else Situation selse
This situation is active if no other situation is active.
Only one situation of this type is possible in one
behavioral model.
The set of all initial situations may also be called the
initiation set, and the set of goal situations the termination
set of an action. Our idea of actions is thus similar to
options as employed in hierarchical reinforcement learning
models [32, 36], although, due to the self-referential
learning of situation and behavioral models, we cannot
distinguish as sharply between primitive actions and
options or, correspondingly, between the lowest level
‘‘core’’ MDP and option policies.
It can be seen in Fig. 4 that descending in the behavioral
model corresponds to ascending in the sensory configura-
tion in order to gain a more detailed situation description
for a refined behavioral performance. For example, if the
situation s1 holds, the associated high-level action ahigh is
performed, which means activating a lower-level behav-
ioral model. The initial situation of this behavioral model is
a specialization s1 of s1. To check if s

1 holds only the new
part of the graph has to be checked as s1 had already been
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Fig. 3 Hierarchical organization of behavioral models. In this
example, executing the action ‘‘pass zebra crossing’’ activates the
lower-level behavioral model, which itself executes different low-
level actions. The green arrows represent the specialization of
situation models (Color figure online)
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situation, because first a quite general situation, which can
be evaluated very quickly, is checked before refinement
starts iteratively. In case the refinement process has to be
truncated (e.g., because of a time-out), an approximation of
a situation is already available, which might be sufficient to
change behavior toward reaching a goal. To check if a
certain situation holds, the situation model checks the
sensory configuration by testing if all conditions for this
situation hold. This means that the subgraph of the con-
cerning situation node has to be parsed. Parsing the situa-
tion subgraph includes checking if leaf node objects are
present and relations hold. At this stage of research, the
parse algorithm is deterministic. But as our parse algorithm
is based on [34], it is possible to extend it to probabilistic
inference.
A simple control strategy for the efficient execution of
such hierarchical behavioral models is to realize a com-
petition between relevant actions at each level of repre-
sentation that is based on evaluating activation/deactivation
conditions and expected rewards:
1. Activation condition. An action can be performed if
the activation condition holds, i.e., if the subject is in a
situation that allows performing the action.
2. Deactivation condition. The action will be deactivated
if the deactivation condition holds, i.e., if the subject is
in an appropriate end situation.
For example, a high-level action representation would
be activated only if the initial condition holds and the
action is associated with the highest expected reward
among all possible actions. Similarly, a lower-level action
would be activated only if requested by the higher-level
action, i.e., if it is part of the behavioral model of the active
high-level action.
As discussed in further sections, it is the major target of
self-referential control to learn and/or extend such semantic
ontologies of situation and behavioral models in an
autonomous goal-directed way.
Self-Referential Control of Autonomous Learning
So far we have described concepts and structures for
knowledge representation such as situations, actions, and
behavioral models. Although they may be hard-coded by a
designer, here we are particularly interested in autono-
mously learning these structures. As learning from scratch
is difficult to demonstrate, we rather assume that a rich set
of structures is already provided and discuss how to extend
the system by ‘‘self-referential‘‘ autonomous learning. Here
the qualification ‘‘self-referential’’ (coined by Ko¨rner [37])
refers to the fact that the system can interpret the envi-
ronment only in terms of ‘‘its own’’ previously acquired
situation models and has to integrate previous and novel
models in a consistent behavior-related way.
In this work, we focus on teacher-guided ‘‘top-down’’
learning: We assume that an external ‘‘teacher‘‘ commu-
nicates an abstract high-level behavioral model for solving
a particular task that typically refers only to high-level
situations and actions. In the subsequent learning phase, the
system has then to refine the teacher model based on its
own behavioral experience. Unlike in unconstrained
‘‘bottom-up’’ learning, the teacher model, although sym-
bolic and ungrounded, can strongly reduce the search space
of possible actions and guide the system quickly toward the
desired behavior. Such a process is similar to learning in
humans, as most ‘‘real‘‘ human behavioral models have not
been acquired by pure exploration, but have rather been
transmitted in a cultural process from teacher to student.
So we can assume that there is already a behavioral
model for a higher-level action, and the system may try to
behave accordingly in order to reach the goal of that action.
As the teacher can communicate only a symbolic behav-
ioral model, the system still has to ground the model
operationally. This means that the system collects episodic
data by trying to perform the actions suggested by the
teacher model until it arrives in the desired goal state.
During subsequent learning, the episodic data are used to
’’complete’’ the situation and action models provided by
the teacher and integrate them into the hierarchy of scene
entity and behavioral models. In general, this will involve
several distinct learning processes including
1. Structural learning and refinement of the behavioral
models,
2. Learning of corresponding feature representations in
order to be able to classify situations correctly based
on sensory inputs, and
3. Learning parameters and values of preferred actions.
The latter two learning problems are relatively well
established, at least if considered in isolation, and assuming










Fig. 4 Links between scene entity model (left) and behavioral models
(right). Behavioral models are strongly connected to the scene entity
model. Iteratively refining the behavioral model means in parallel
refining the scene entity model
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control approach, in our work by the Q-learning algorithm
which is a specific reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm
[29]. The algorithm has a function Qi : Si  Ai ! R which
calculates the quality of performing action ain in situation
sim for each behavioral model bmi. Problem 2 is usually
solved by standard supervised or unsupervised pattern
recognition and machine-learning approaches. We employ
an algorithm for information generation as explained fur-
ther below to generate the learning data necessary to extend
and refine the sensory scene representation. For the struc-
tural learning problem 1, we suggest a novel approach
where extending the model structure is based on the
detection of certain graph motifs in behavioral models.
This approach includes the structural learning concepts of
specialization and generalization which are explained in
the following.
Specialization
It has been proposed that the brain uses the difference
between expected and actual sensory experience as a trig-
ger for knowledge generation [38]. Based on this principle
of knowledge generation, we introduce a mechanism for
structural learning to refine the existing knowledge base.
The trigger for specialization is the graph motif illus-
trated in Fig. 5 (left) which shows a clip from a behavioral
model where performing action a in situation s may lead
either to the expected situation s1 with the expected feed-
back F1 or to the unexpected situation s2 with an unex-
pected feedback F2. Such a motif expresses basically the
uncertainty of the system as it is unable to predict the
outcome of a certain action in a certain situation. In our
system such a graph motif triggers structural learning in
order to reduce uncertainty and increase the system’s
ability to predict future situations. Here, this means to
extend the behavioral model, especially replacing action a
by a high-level action ahigh through specializing situation s
into two new situations s and selse such that executing
action a in situation selse leads to the previously expected
situation s1, whereas choosing a in situation s
 leads to the
new situation s2 that was unexpected previously. Thus, the
refined behavioral model can better predict the outcome of
performing action a and react accordingly.
Once the specialization process is completed, for every
new situation the optimal action can be determined via
reinforcement learning. This learning of the optimal policy
can use already experienced memory to pre-learn from
mind. This allows to make a more accurate educated guess
for the optimal action in the next learning cycle.
Although here we implement only on a simple deter-
ministic simulation scenario, realistic stochastic environ-
ments imply that certain situation transitions may depend
on factors not observable by the agent. In that case, the
described specialization procedure would not be able to
improve the agent’s performance. To avoid uncontrolled
proliferation of specialized situation models, it would then
be necessary to extend our model with methods that can
deal with partially observable or hidden factors [31, 39].
Another mechanism counteracting specialization is gener-
alization as described in the following section.
Generalization
Another graph motif that triggers structural learning is
shown in Fig. 6, left. Here, the system has learned a
behavioral model where an outcome s3 can be reached
from two different initial situations s1 and s2 by executing
the same action a. Such a graph motif means that situations
s1 and s2 are similar because both can lead to s3 by exe-
cuting a. Therefore, it makes sense to generalize both
involved situations s1 and s2 to a novel situation model s1_2
where action a can be performed (Fig. 6, right). Such
structural generalization renders a more compact descrip-
tion of the fact that we can reach s3 from s1_2 by choosing
a. This can potentially simplify behavioral models and
accelerate prediction and planning. In the simplest case, the
scene entity model of s1_2 is an OR connection of the
sensory configurations of s1 and s2. By applying graph
reduction tools this newly connected graph can be further
reduced. Thus generalization is used to compress unnec-
essary specialized situations or acquire novel higher-level
symbols [40]. A situation is unnecessarily specialized if the
optimal action determined via policy learning is identical

















Fig. 5 Specialization refines the behavioral model as well as the








Fig. 6 Generalization combines situations having the same optimal
action that lead to the same successor situation. Thus, generalization
avoids an unnecessary separation of situations that have a similar
action/outcome relation
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Implementation
We have realized the self-referential (SR) learning archi-
tecture within a reinforcement learning framework. For our
simulation experiments, we have employed the micro-
scopic traffic simulator CarD [41]. The following describes
the implementation of an agent that is capable of SR
learning.
Simplifications for Sensory and Scene
Representation
As the focus of the current work is on the basic mecha-
nisms of self-referential learning rather than low-level
sensory representation and object classification, we have
employed the following simplifications:
1. Ideal Object Detector
We assume an ideal object detector, which is able to
deliver all visible objects in the scene as well as
corresponding object attributes without any uncer-
tainty. This simplifies semantic information generation
and reduces full probabilistic inference at the object
level to a simple deterministic framework. At a later
stage of research, we will include also uncertainty and
attention control.
2. Object Oriented Scene
The entire scene can be represented as a set O of
objects oi ¼ ðAtÞ. Each object has a set At of attributes
ati ¼ ðatli; atviÞ, where ali is an attribute label and atvi
the attribute value. Every object contains the integer-
valued attribute with atli ¼’category,’ which defines
the category of an object (e.g., ati ¼ ð0category0; 1Þ,
where 1 defines the category for cars). Such a
representation vastly simplifies and speeds up recog-
nition tasks because higher-level processes do not have
to cope with lower-level feature and object detection
problems.
Self-Referential Learning Architecture
Similar to common RL frameworks, the agent has to per-
form certain tasks in a behavioral environment associated
with certain rewards. The SR agent contains the self-ref-
erential autonomous learning architecture as introduced
before. The agent is able to sense the world only through
certain sensors, but is not aware of the entire world state. In
the current implementation, the sensor is an ideal object
detector that detects objects in a certain range in front of
the car. As explained above, the detector returns for each
object certain attributes including category, position, ori-
entation, and speed.
At this stage of research, the agent’s actions are limited
to longitudinal control, that is, setting gas and brake pedal
pressure of the car. For simplicity we have not yet included
transversal control like steering. Another input to the agent
is a feedback signal f ¼ ðl; rÞ comprising a label l and an
actual reward r that enable the agent to evaluate and
improve behavioral and recognition performance. The
interaction of all important elements of the learning
framework is illustrated in Fig. 7.
To enable SR control of learning as introduced by
Ko¨rner [1], the agent needs a semantic memory, an epi-
sodic memory and some kind of learning control which
will be introduced in the following.
For SR learning it is insufficient to store only those
entities that have already a representation in the situation
models of semantic memory. Rather, it is also necessary to
store additional details of experienced behavioral episodes
in order to discover new relations between sensory input
and action outcome and learn new situation and behavioral
models. For that purpose, we introduce two-memory sys-
tems: First, a semantic memory system for situation and
behavioral models that represent only behaviorally relevant
knowledge extracted from many behavioral episodes. And,
second, an episodic memory to store detailed representa-
tions of individual behavioral episodes. As explained
below, such episodes are linked to the semantic models to
give a concise interpretation of what has happened, but



























Fig. 7 Self-referential learning framework determines the interac-
tions between semantic memory, episodic memory, learning control,
and the environment. Red arrow corresponds to self-referential
learning (Color figure online)
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In correspondence to the two memory systems, we need
two control structures for behavior and learning: First, the
behavioral control unit employs behavioral models of
semantic memory to generate optimal behavior based on
recognized situations and calculated action values. Second,
based on unexpected behavioral episodes, the learning
control unit triggers certain learning mechanisms to gen-
erate refined semantic models for situations and behavior.
Semantic Memory
As explained above, the semantic memory stores plans,
how to execute actions according to situations as well as
scene entity models for the recognition of situations. The
semantic memory contains all the knowledge collected and
understood by the agent.
The semantic memory can be modeled as SM ¼
ðBM; SCÞ, where BM is a set of hierarchical behavioral
models bmi and SC a set of hierarchical scene entity models.
Each situation sj in each bmi is connected to a node ðscÞj in
the scene entity model. A situation can only be determined
through the combination of its behavioral context, given by
the location in a behavioral model and the scene entity
model.
Episodic Memory
An essential part of the SR framework is the episodic
memory. The episodic memory is necessary to generate
new semantic knowledge. More exactly, it is necessary to
store episodic data that cannot be explained by the current
semantic models (and that may indeed turn out to be
irrelevant for behavior) in order to be able to refine the
semantic knowledge base at a later time when a sufficient
amount of episodic data has been collected. Such episodes
must be stored in a well structured format to allow the
agent to link the unexplained episodic data to the relevant
behavioral context. Only then the agent will be able to
extract relevant aspects and include them in the correct
situation and behavioral models of semantic memory. This
means that episodic memories must have a similar hierar-
chical order as behavioral models. Therefore, we have
modeled hierarchical episodic memory as EM ¼ ðES;EPÞ,
where ES is a set of entire situations es and EP is a set of
episodes ep.
An entire situation is basically a snapshot of the whole
scene at time t and can be modeled as est ¼ ðSOt;Ft;ACtÞ,
where SO is a set of Objects O sensed at time t, F the
gathered feedback and AC the action control at time t. AC
represents the current state of a behavioral model at time t,
specifically the performed hierarchical actions as well as
the active hierarchical situation models. It contains all
visible objects with its attributes, a hierarchical snapshot of
the active actions and situations and the received feedback.
Before storing the received feedback, it is checked against
the expected feedback by the agent’s world model.
An episode structures the stream of entire situations
according to the behavioral model that has been executed
by the behavioral control during experiencing the episode.
Thus, an episode may contain several lower-level episodes
reflecting the hierarchical structure of the corresponding
behavioral model as illustrated in Fig. 8. This allows the
agent to address entire situations in relation to corre-
sponding ‘‘start situation - action - end situation transi-
tions’’: An episode can be modeled as ep ¼ ðsstart; send; a;
ðtðsstartÞ; tðsendÞÞÞ and is defined as the transition from a
start situation sstart to an end situation send by performing
the action a. tðsstartÞ is the time index of the first occurrence
of the start situation and tðsendÞ the first occurrence of the
end situation. Thus, all entire situations esðtðsstartÞ t tðsendÞÞ
belong to the episode ep. As mentioned before, an action
a may be either a low-level action or a high-level action
containing a lower-level behavioral model. Thus, episodes
are structured according to the same hierarchical order as
behavioral models.
The hierarchical structure of the episodic memory is
illustrated in Fig. 8.
Behavioral Control
The behavioral control BC is the control unit to execute the
behavioral model. This means, first, to check whether
certain situations are active (by employing the corre-
sponding scene entity models) and, second, to choose an
optimal action by evaluating action values of all possible
actions. For each active behavioral model, a separate
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Fig. 8 Hierarchical episodic memory orders the stream of entire
situations according to the hierarchy of the executed behavioral model
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structure of behavioral models, there are usually several
behavioral control units active at the same time, which
check situations and select actions on different levels of
abstraction, down to the lowest and finest behavioral model
that executes a low-level action. Here, any higher-level
action executes recursively lower-level behavioral models
and, thus, activates the corresponding behavioral control
units on each level.
Learning Control
The learning control unit LC is the basic control instance
for any learning task. For example, as mentioned before,
the mechanism of specialization learning is triggered by the
graph motif where starting from one situation s1 and per-
forming action a can lead to two different situations, one
expected and the other unexpected. So the trigger for
learning is the difference between sensory expectation and
experience.
In this first proposal of an implementation, we use the
feedback f ¼ ðl; rÞ as a measure of expectation. Thus, any
differences in expected feedback and actually received
feedback activates structural learning. A fully trained
behavioral model is then able to explain (meaning receiv-
ing a certain feedback in a situation that expects receiving
this feedback) and predict (meaning that the resulting
feedback of a certain action in a certain situation is known)
feedback.
The overall learning architecture is illustrated in Fig. 9
and is divided into three sub-units dealing with interpre-
tation of world events, semantic knowledge generation, and
behavioral learning.
• Interpretation of world events
Compares the sensory input with the internal world
model. A difference in expectation and real-world
experience triggers semantic knowledge generation. In
our implementation, this means that, at every timestep,
the received feedback is compared to the feedback
expected in the active situation at every active level of
abstraction. Such gathered feedback F is then included
together with the expected feedback in each entire
situation that is stored in the episodic memory. By this
it becomes possible to extract information about which
situation–action combinations lead to unexpected suc-
cessor situations to control structural learning described
below. Although potentially large amounts of episodic
data are gathered at every time step, offline adaptation
of situation and behavior models remains feasible
because actual rewards r[ 0 are sparse events that
occur typically only if an action has been successfully
completed (i.e., if a higher-level goal state has been
reached).
• Semantic knowledge generation
A continued difference in expectation indicates that the
actual situation (state) space is not sufficient to perform
a given situation transition by a certain action. Thus,
the situation (or state)-space has to be adapted to the
behavioral needs. This means to refine situation models
to reduce uncertainty in the expected outcome of this
action. We call this process semantic knowledge
generation as it allows to explain and eliminate
differences between simulated and real world by
refining the situation models through structural learning
mechanisms like specialization. This leads to a refined
situation space in which a specialized behavior depend-
ing on the feedback is possible.
Depending on the agent’s experience, the structural
refinement might not always be optimal and could
produce a hierarchical deep redundancy in the situation
space. To prevent this the mechanism of generalization
is used. This mechanism is triggered by the graph motif
explained earlier and reduces unnecessarily specialized
situations. The target of the interplay between special-
ization and generalization is the convergence toward a
situation space that is minimal (in terms of situation
numbers and hierarchical levels) but still optimal for
behavioral performance.
• Behavioral Learning
Determines the optimal action for the new refined
situation model. In our current implementation, seman-
tic knowledge generation enables the agent to react
with a refined behavior to target or avoid certain types
of feedback. Thus, maximizing the expected feedback



























Fig. 9 Self-referential learning. Difference between expected feed-
back from the internal world model and the real-world feedback
triggers the semantic knowledge generation to refine the internal
world model, followed by the behavioral learning to optimize the
behavior
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learning methods are predestined to solve such opti-
mization tasks. Here, we have used Q-learning to
determine the optimal action. At this point of research,
each behavioral model bmi, thus each level of the
hierarchy, contains it’s own decoupled Q-learner
Qi : Si  Ai ! R, where Si and Ai is a set of situation
and actions of bmi. In future work, this may be replaced
by a fully hierarchical Q-learner like MAXQ [42].
Semantic knowledge generation and behavioral learning
closely interact with each other. By generating new
semantic knowledge a behavioral optimization is possible.
In turn, once behavior has changed, it may be necessary to
adapt the world model again, for example, as the actions
performed by the optimized policy may have unpre-
dictable outcomes again.
To control this cooperation of semantic knowledge
generation and behavior learning is a difficulty that is not
fully solved at this point. After a situation is refined by
semantic knowledge generation, the optimal situation–ac-
tion mapping has to be determined through reinforcement
learning. While behavioral learning is in progress semantic
knowledge generation is deactivated. Once the behavioral
learning has converged, the semantic knowledge genera-
tion can be activated again.
Structural Learning
As described above, we use feedback f ¼ ðl; rÞ as a mea-
sure of expectation. Thus, a difference between expected
feedback and actually gathered feedback leads to structural
refinement by specialization. By doing so, the implemented
mechanisms of knowledge refinement are special cases of
the basic mechanism explained in the previous sections,
where generally every unexpected part of a situation con-
tributes to this measure. In our current implementation of
the specialization mechanism, we differentiate between
‘‘gathering feedback when expecting feedback, but gath-
ering the wrong type/value of feedback’’ and ‘‘gathering
feedback when not expecting any feedback.’’ The first case
triggers the process of feedback specialization and the
second one triggers feedback expectation. Both cases are
special cases of the general graph motif for specialization.
Specialization enables refined behavioral learning. Thus,
for every new situation the optimal action can be deter-
mined as explained earlier. To learn the optimal policy,
already experienced memory can be used to ‘‘pre-learn
from mind’’ (use knowledge from the episodic memory to
perform offline learning). This allows the agent to perform
a more accurate educated guess for the optimal action in
the next learning cycle.
Feedback specialization is triggered if some feedback
was expected in a situation, but a different feedback
occurred. Thus to enable the agent to react specifically to a
certain outcome (feedback) of an action starting from the
same start situation, this situation has to be specialized into
two situations. As shown in Fig. 10, executing action a
in situation s usually leads to the situation s1 with the
expected feedback F1 but sometimes the unexpected
feedback F2 is gathered. This is a trigger for feedback
specialization. This means to extend the behavioral model,
especially replacing action a by a high-level action ahigh by
specializing the start situation s1 into two new situations s

1
and s1;else such that performing action a in situation s1;else
leads to the previously expected feedback F1, whereas
choosing a in situation s1 leads to the new previously
unexpected feedback F2. The scene entity model of s

1 is a
specialization of s1 and extends s1 by some knowledge as
illustrated in 10 (bottom). There are now two goal situa-
tions of ahigh, s21 and s22 with the same scene entity model
as s2, but one expecting the feedback F1 and one expecting
F2. The sensory configuration of s2 is not illustrated, due to
the fact that the sensory configuration does not change.
Feedback expectation consists of two parts. The first one
is feedback interpretation and the second one is feedback
prediction. This process enables the system to react to any
feedback at any time. Once a feedback is received, when no
feedback was expected, the agent tries to explain why
feedback occurred, to expect and predict it in the future.
This method also enables the agent to split one high-level
action into several sub-actions (chaining) and enables the
specialization of subtasks.
As shown in Fig. 11, once the agent receives feedback,
the agent tries to explain when this feedback occurs
(feedback situation) during this event. In a next step, the
agent checks the near past before this feedback and tries to
create some predictor (toward the feedback situation). In
the current implementation, the predictor evaluates the
structure of the raw sensory scene representation, in par-


























Fig. 10 Feedback specialization refines the behavioral model as well
as the scene entity model to improve the behavior
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feedback, and trains a different classifier with the attributes
of the objects leading to the feedback. It has to be men-
tioned, that this is a restriction, because the feedback has to
be predictable by the same objects which are causing the
feedback.
If different types of feedback occur before the agent is
able to finalize the expectation task, due to the lack of
information gathered to explain one feedback, the infor-
mation might be enough to predict the general event of
feedback. In further steps, this prediction of general feed-
back can be specialized to predict either of the feedbacks.
The information that there will be feedback might be very
helpful for realizing attention control, for example, by
focusing processing resources specifically on the difference
between the feedbacks. However, this aspect is not further
targeted at this stage of research.
Semantic Knowledge Generation
An important part of self-referential learning is the gener-
ation of important knowledge from experience. Semantic
knowledge is important to understand a situation and create
a model of the environment based on behavioral needs. The
reason to extract knowledge is because the internal world
model differs from the external input. Thus, the internal
world model has to be refined.
In our current implementation, we use a two stage
knowledge extractor as shown in Fig. 12. The first stage is
fed with the clustered set of episodes, which belong to the
actual event. The clustering separates the episodes which
can be explained by the internal model from those which
cannot be explained. Based on these clusters, a feature
selector calculates the information gain for each involved
object to measure the object’s relevance for discriminating
between these different clusters (cf., [43]). If the infor-
mation gain is above some threshold, the type of object is
considered as ‘‘relevant for the situation‘‘. This object
represents a leaf node in the sensory configuration.
The second stage takes all relevant objects, which
includes the already-known relevant objects and the new
gathered relevant objects and performs the information
gain calculation on all attributes of these objects. Again if
the information gain is above some threshold the attribute
is considered as relevant.
Finally, based on the relevant attributes, a classifier with
dimension of relevant attributes and based on the clustered
episodes is trained. This classifier represents a relation in
the sensory configuration. Based on the new relation clas-
sifiers and the new relevant objects, the internal world
model can be refined. The following gives a more detailed
description of the algorithm:
1. from the episodic memory collect episodes ep with the
same start situation sstart and the same action a
2. cluster these episodes by the classes Cexp and Cunexp.
Cexp defines the class of episodes that lead to the
expected end situation send;exp. Cunexp defines the class
of episodes that lead to an unexpected end situation
send;unexp.
3. determine relevant objects relObj
(a) loop through entire situations es belonging to all
episodes ep inside the classes Cexp and Cunexp
extract all appeared object categories
O:Að0category0Þ into CATall.
(b) loop through entire situations es belonging to all
episodes ep inside the classes Cexp and Cunexp

















Fig. 11 Feedback expectation and expectation specialization are both
used to explain and predict external feedback. If no feedback is
expected, but feedback occurs, feedback expectation is performed. If





































Fig. 12 Semantic knowledge generation. The first stage extracts the
most relevant objects to explain the difference in expected and real
feedback. The second stage determines all relevant attributes of new
and already-known objects to train a relation classifier. Both, new
relevant objects and relations are used to refine the situation
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every category in CATall, which is True is an
object of that category appears in the entire
situation and False if not.
(c) for each category cat in CATall calculate the
information gain I based on the classification of
the two categories Cexp and Cunexp.
(d) relevant objects relObj are objects of a category
with an information gain above some threshold.
4. determine the relation for the refined situation
(a) for both classes Cexp and Cunexp collect all entire
situations that contain all relevant relObj and all
known objects knownObj. Known objects are
objects, that are already part of the scene entity
model of the situation sstart.
(b) for every attribute of every known and relevant
object calculate the information gain. The
attributes with an information gain above some
threshold are defined as relevant attributes and
form the feature space of a relation classifier
introduced earlier.
(c) train a new relation classifier relClassifier based
on the two classes Cexp and Cunexp.
5. integrate the new relevant objects relObj as well as the
relation classifier relClassifier into the scene entity
model as shown in Fig. 12.
The node specializeds1 defines the new specialized sit-
uation of the start situation s1 and allows now the refine-
ment of the behavioral model and a refined behavior.
Simulation Experiments
Scenario
The purpose of the following scenario is to demonstrate
aspects of self-referential autonomous learning and to show
the feasibility of our approach. This means to learn new
situation and behavioral models in a simple simulated
traffic scenario. Here, an agent has to learn to drive a car
safely over a zebra crossing as illustrated by Fig. 13: More
specifically, the scenario is that of a car approaching and
driving safely over a zebra crossing without intimidating or
hurting pedestrians crossing the street, but also without
unnecessarily wasting time. The system will be provided
initially with some mid-level preprocessed sensory infor-
mation such as ego-velocity, location of zebra crossing, as
well as probable locations of pedestrians. Thus, in our
scene representation there are several types of objects
possible which are listed in Table 1 with their attributes. As
our current implementation has only a ‘‘symbolic’’
interface with the CarD traffic simulation environment, the
scene ontology of objects is assumed to be fixed in the
following, and structural learning is limited to the situation
and behavior models for driving over the zebra crossing.
Additionally, the system is provided with a high-level
behavioral model (that could be communicated, for
example, by a driving teacher) in order to specify the task
and the high-level processing steps to solve the task. This
boils down to the specification of a set of rules such as ‘‘IF
not arrived at target position THEN continue driving.’’ Of
course such models are incomplete as they lack (1) situa-
tions not preconsidered by the teacher, (2) full specification
of situation models and (3) full specification of action
models and their integration with lower-level behavioral
models referred to in the teacher model. In order to com-
plete learning of full behavioral and situation models, the
system has to (1) explore the state space, (2) integrate low
and high-level behavior models , (3) learn new situation
models (at intermediary levels) as required by the task, and
(4) optimize behavior, e.g., with respect to time and/or
energy costs. Here, the costs correspond to either the
reward obtained for arriving at the target location by
driving safely over the zebra crossing or the punishment for
hurting pedestrians. This general procedure can be pursued
in scenarios of various difficulty degrees as explained
below. We assume high-level actions ‘‘stop’’ for stopping
in front of a stop line and ‘‘drive’’ for accelerating to a
certain speed and then keeping this speed.
Scenario1: Learn to Understand the Meaning
of a Pedestrian and Wheelchair for Driving Safely
over a Zebra Crossing
We introduce a scenario with a teacher model for driving
from a start location to an end location. Here, the teacher
model, illustrated in Fig. 14 (top), is essentially a behav-
ioral model with three situations, ‘‘driving free,’’ ‘‘ap-
proaching z.c.,’’ and ‘‘leaving z.c.’’ In all three situations,
the action ’’drive‘‘ is selected by the teacher to be
Fig. 13 Scenario
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performed. ‘‘driving free’’ is active as long as none of the
other situations is active. ‘‘approaching z.c.’’ becomes
active as soon as the agent car is within a bounding box
around the zebra crossing and approaching the zebra
crossing. ‘‘leaving z.c.’’ gets active for the moment the
agent leaves the z.c. This situation expects some reward for
successfully driving over the zebra crossing.
By performing the teacher model, the system will ini-
tially be able to perform the task quite well as long as there
are no pedestrians or wheelchairs crossing the z.c. How-
ever, once hurting or intimidating a pedestrian or a
wheelchair user, the agent will experience punishment.
Thus, the initial model is not optimal and fine enough to
perform the task sufficiently (meaning not hurting anybody
while crossing the z.c.).
Results
After a preset number of occurrences of the motif for
feedback specialization (expecting some feedback, but
archiving a different feedback), this mechanism gets active.
As seen in Fig. 14 (from top to bottom), the agent first
determines the occurrence of the pedestrian in a certain
relation to the z.c. and the agent car as the cause for the
unexpected feedback. This induces feedback specialization
of the situation ‘‘approaching z.c.’’ into ‘‘approaching z.c.
with ped’’ and ‘‘else.’’ Based on the refined behavioral
model, Q-learning is used to determine the optimal action
for each of the new situations, with the result, that the agent
performs the action ‘‘stop’’ in ‘‘approaching z.c. with ped’’
and ‘‘drive’’ in ‘‘else.’’ The ‘‘else‘‘ situation represents
basically the situation ‘‘approaching z.c. without ped.’’ As
shown in Fig. 15, the value of punishments/tries is signif-
icantly reduced after this step. But there are still punish-
ments left. This is due to the occurrence of wheelchairs
which cross from time to time and are not detected as
pedestrians. Thus, after collecting some more punishments,
our system determines the occurrence of the wheelchair in
a certain relation to the z.c. and the agent car as the cause
for the unexpected feedback (punishment), and, as before,
the behavioral model is extended by the situations ‘‘ap-
proaching z.c. with wheelchair’’ and ‘‘else.’’ After
Table 1 Types of objects as
used for scene representation
Pedestrian object House object AgentCar object Wheelchair object
Category = pedestrian Category = house Category = self Category = wheelchair
xpos xpos xpos xpos
ypos ypos ypos ypos
Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation




























































appr z.c. with wheel
Fig. 14 Scenario: specialization and Policy Learning starting from
teacher-given behavioral model (top, left) and scene entity model for
approaching z.c. (top, right) in 4 steps down to the final learned
behavioral model (bottom, left) with the extended sensory configu-
ration (bottom, right). The steps are Specialization to understand the
meaning of pedestrians at a z.c. followed by policy learning to obtain
the best action in the new situation, followed by specialization to
understand the meaning of a wheelchair at a z.c. again with policy
learning
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determining the optimal actions, the value of punishments/
tries significantly decreases again.
Thus, after self-referential learning, our system is able to
understand the meaning of a pedestrian and a wheelchair
crossing a z.c. and also to perform the optimal action in
each of the situations.
Scenario2: Learn to Understand the Meaning
of a Zebra Crossing in Combination with a Crossing
Pedestrian for Driving Safely Along a Road.
We introduce a scenario with a teacher model for driving
from a start location to an end location. Here, the teacher
model, illustrated in Fig. 16, is essentially a behavioral
model with two situations, ‘‘driving free’’ and ‘‘end.’’ In
‘‘driving free,’’ the action ‘‘drive’’ is selected by the teacher
to be performed. ‘‘driving free’’ is active as long as the
agent didn’t arrive at the end location. Compared to the
previous scenario, there is no knowledge about a zebra
crossing and no situation that determines when the agent is
approaching a z.c. Also, no feedback is expected by the
agent during the task. By this, the system will initially be
able to perform the task quite well as long as there is no z.c.
with pedestrians. Once the z.c. is crossed some kind of
feedback is archived by the agent, which is not expected:
usually more often the reward signal for crossing safely,
but sometimes as well punishment for crossing and hurting
pedestrians. The very limited initial model is not optimal
and fine enough to perform the task sufficiently (meaning
not hurting anybody while driving). Thus, neither the
meaning of ‘‘zebra crossing’’ nor a corresponding behav-
ioral model for such situations is pre-designed by the
teacher.
Results
After a certain number of occurrences of the motif for
feedback expectation (expecting no feedback, but archiving
some feedback), this mechanism gets active. As seen in
Fig. 16, the agent first determines the occurrence of the z.c.
in a certain relation to the agent car as the cause for the
unexpected feedback. Thus, based on the feedback expec-
tation mechanism the situation ‘‘driving free‘‘ is special-
ized to two situations: ‘‘feedback at z.c.’’ is expecting the
feedback right when crossing the z.c. ‘‘approaching z.c.‘‘ is
the predictor for the feedback. Thus, based on all entire
situations right before the actual feedback, which contain
Fig. 15 Cumulative number of punishments. 1st phase (0\t\30):
behavior defined by teacher model; 2nd phase (30\t\110): refined
model after learning to cope with a pedestrian at a z.c.; 3rd phase
(t[ 110): refined model to cope with both pedestrians and wheel-













































Fig. 16 Feedback expectation applied to scenario 1 to explain and
predict the feedback when driving over a zebra crossing (reward for
crossing without getting too close to a pedestrian and punishment for
getting so close to a pedestrian while crossing)
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the relevant objects z.c. and the agent car, this predictor is
trained. The resulting refined behavioral model is shown in
Fig. 16 (middle). At this point the situation, ‘‘feedback at
z.c.’’ is expecting some reward, because this happened
much more often than punishment for hurting pedestrians.
Thus, the agent is able to predict and understand the
meaning of a zebra crossing, but not yet the meaning of
pedestrians at a zebra crossing. The result of this scenario
may be the basis for Scenario 1, which uses feedback
specialization together with behavioral learning (RL) to
refine the model further and optimize behavior as shown in
Fig. 16 (bottom).
Summary and Discussion
Scene understanding and situation recognition is an
essential technological prerequisite for intelligent sys-
tems applications such as autonomous driving or mobile
human support systems [44, 45]. Current approaches
toward scene analysis and situation understanding face
several essential problems. For example, real-world
scenes are too complex and undergo too many variations
that simple appearance-based methods would be useful
for predicting future episodes of behavior in similar
situations [10–12]. Moreover, state-of-the-art systems
cannot adequately solve the problem of autonomous
learning of structured scene or situation representations
that are usefully constrained by behavioral needs [17,
29, 32]
In this work, we have developed a cognitive archi-
tecture for self-referential autonomous learning of situ-
ation representation. Our system is inspired by brain
architecture based on neuronal cell assemblies and
associative learning [46–50], and comprises subsystems
for working memory, episodic memory, and semantic
memory including structured situation models and hier-
archical behavioral models for planning and decision
making [13, 29, 32, 51]. By self-referential learning, we
mean the control process of autonomously extending
subjective knowledge representations. Similar to hier-
archical reinforcement learning (HRL), this involves
behavioral optimization of hierarchical policy models
[29, 32, 42, 52–56]. There, so-called options ðI ; pbÞ are
used for structuring the action and situation space, where
a policy p can be activated if the agent is in a primitive
state s 2 I that belongs to the set of the option’s initial
states I and will be followed until the agent’s state is in
some target set s 2 b. Thus, s and I correspond to dif-
ferent levels of a hierarchical situation model, and HRL
provides methods to optimize option policies. While
most HRL approaches assume a given pre-designed
hierarchical structure [32, 36, 42, 57] or only bottom-up
learning from the level of primitive states [53, 54, 58],
our approach targets at general structural learning of
behavioral and situation models by extending ‘‘is-a’’ and
‘‘has-parts’’ ontologies of situation models, including
both specialization and generalization [16–18, 40].
Besides proposing basic architectural concepts, we have
also described a first implementation of our architecture.
This implementation was tested within a simple simulated
traffic scenario to demonstrate the viability of our
approach. Instead of unconstrained bottom-up construction
of novel situation and behavior models, our system adopts
an abstract model that is communicated by a teacher in
terms of the current knowledge representations. By trying
to execute the abstract teacher model, our system can
produce structured episodic data and evaluate the outcome
through a reward system. Triggered by the mismatch
between predicted and actual action outcome, our system
can exploit the episodic data for structural learning. This
results in a hierarchical extensions of situation models and
their integration into a refined behavioral model. Therefore,
our system is able to autonomously learn novel situation
types and integrate them into the ontology of previously
acquired knowledge.
Although the current implementation solves only
quite a simple problem, we think that our approach
scales favorably to more complex tasks. For example,
one potential problem is the proliferation of situation
nodes in the behavioral models that may occur in bot-
tom-up approaches due to uncontrolled specialization, in
particular, in stochastic environments including partially
observable or hidden states [31, 39]. As our system
includes both specialization and generalization as well as
a way for a teacher to communicate high-level abstract
models to specify a raw solution to a task, this will
strongly constrain the agent’s search space and keep the
clustering procedure described in ‘‘Semantic Knowledge
Generation’’ section feasible.
Still, our learning algorithm may be too complex for
an immediate online implementation of autonomous
learning in current embedded automotive hardware.
Instead, we rather consider the support of model design
as potential short-term applications of our system: This
can be achieved, for example, by simulating complex
traffic scenes to let the agent learn an adequate structure
for the situation and behavioral models that may later be
employed in real vehicles. In addition to simulations, the
‘‘self-referential’’ loop (Fig. 7) may be closed by col-
lecting episodic traces recorded from real driving vehi-
cles, whereas the structural model updates would occur
offline. On the long term, however, we believe that full
online autonomous learning cannot be realized much
cheaper than in our system. In future work, we therefore
will extend our system toward more complex application
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scenarios and additional types of self-referential struc-
tural learning.
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